A worker' s performance may vary over time for reasons that have nothing to do with his inherent abilities, motivation, background and education. For example, over time the nature of a fi rm' s business may change to reduce the degree of match between the human capital of the worker and the needs of the fi rm' s business. When fi rms make hiring decisions, which are costly to implement or reverse, the uncertain human capital productivity has signifi cant practical implications. Conventional wisdom is that workers whose future productivity is more risky should be paid less than those whose perceived future productivity is less risky. This paper shows that in many institutional contexts the conventional wisdom is incorrect: risky workers should be paid more rather than less because those in risky segments are that much harder to replace. But on the other hand, we fi nd that higher wages among those whose value to fi rms is more uncertain is also matched by a higher degree of unemployment among these groups.
The literature on statistical discrimination describes how firms attempt to use a workers' observable attributes to estimate his expected productivity (see Phelps, 1972) . In this paper we assume that the expected productivity level is the same for all workers and analyse the effect of differences in the variance of future productivity.
is discovered, the younger he is and the easier it is to fire him.
But note that the underlying assumption is that wages not follow performance, the risky hire is not going to be rewarded for good performance. We relax this assumption and allow wages, quite reasonably in our view, to follow productivity. We find that even with relaxing this assumption, the conclusion in Lazear (1998) continues to hold. 
Profit maximisation Profit maximisation
We assume that labour is the only factor of production and workers can only be hired at a cost, making them a quasi-fixed asset (see Oi, 1962) . Moreover, we assume that the number of firms is finite due to the presence of fixed entry costs. The representative firm's production function is assumed to be
where L is the aggregate productivity coefficient and E denotes the number of efficiency units of labour. We capture worker heterogeneity by assuming that workers may differ in the future in terms of the number of efficiency units of labour that they embody. In contrast to Lazear (1998) we assume that wages follow productivity. In particular, we assume that firms decide on the level of wages per efficiency unit of labour w and the hiring rate, h. These are the representative firm's two choice variables.
In the absence of uncertainty, the percentage change in employment, measured in efficiency units of labour, E, is given by the hire rate h, minus the quit rate, q.
We assume that although workers post-training productivity is known, 
We let f Î (0,1] measure the importance of uncertainty about the quality of workers who quit and take this to measure the extent to which individual workers are complements in production, that is to what extent one worker' s productivity depends on the average level of productivity among his colleagues (see Lucas, 1988 ).
We then have, using Ito's Lemma, the Bellman equation that describes the representative firm's optimisation with respect to the number of hires and the real wage offered, The first order condition for h is
The two We now have a solution for the optimal hiring rate,
An increase in hiring costs µ decreases hiring. The optimal rate of hiring is also a function of the marginal value of workers V E taking into account uncertainty about their abilities as before.
We now assume the following functional form for the quit rate The quit rate is a negative function of the ratio of the firm's own real wage to the average real wage elsewhere, w A , and ␣ is the quit rate when w = w A R. Taking the derivative with respect to the real wage gives the following first order condition,
or,
The quitting propensity ␤ enters in a multiplicative manner as a key determinant of wages, which implies that if workers' propensity to quit did not depend on the wage, the optimal wage would be zero.
Uncertainty enters the determination of the wage in two ways. First, as
shown below, the first derivative term is lower because of uncertainty about who will quit in the future.
Second, the second derivative term makes the optimal wage higher because higher wages reduce quits and there is uncertainty about the ability of replacement workers. For the functional forms considered here, we will find the second effect to be stronger so wages are unambiguously higher because of uncertainty.
Substituting the two first order conditions and the production function into the Bellman equation
gives the following equation
where
In the appendix we show that the Bellman equation has the solution,
where 
Effect of Uncertainty Effect of Uncertainty on Hiring on Hiring
Using the results of equation (6) and equation (10), we now investigate how hiring is affected by uncertainty,
Hiring is a positive function of the aggregate productivity coefficient, L, and a negative function of the real interest rate , hiring costs µ, the propensity to quit ␤, and the importance of quit-related uncertainty, f. The impact of increased uncertainty is more difficult to assess. Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to
Effect of Uncertainty Effect of Uncertainty on Wages on Wages
We can use equation (7) and equation (10) to obtain an explicit solution for the wage,
The real wage is a positive function of aggregate productivity and training costs and a negative function of the real interest rate and the importance of quit-related uncertainty. Taking the derivative of (13) with respect to 2 gives
The first term is the effect of uncertainty about hire quality. This leads to a reduction in hiring. which in equilibrium gives the following equation using the quit function and the solution for the optimal hiring rate in equation (11),
Employment is a positive function of the aggregate productivity coefficient and a negative function of the real interest rate and the propensity to quit. Now taking R to be constant term, we define
and then take the derivative with respect to 2 ,
The derivative is unambiguously negative. 7 This is caused solely by the effect of uncertainty on the hiring rate. The quit is not affected because a higher wage in one firm is matched by a higher wage in all other firms.
We found that the hiring rate is 
Conclusions Conclusions Appendix Appendix
In this appendix, we show that the solution of the turnover-training model is, 20) where and are constants to be determined. We first show that equation (9) 
it follows that the pair (, ) satisfies:
Equating terms of equal order results in two equations in two unknowns (, ). Since equation (22) 
It then follows that at any t, employment is a square-integrable process with continuous sample paths (Karatzas and Shreve, 1988, Thm. 2.9, p. 289) . Furthermore, by the same theorem, there exists a constant C such that,
uniformly.
From the solution for the value function, equation (9), and using
Jensen's Inequality we also get,
Using equation (28), it follows that there exist constants C 1 and C 2 such that,
which implies the transversality condition, lim e ÿt VðE t Þ 0 t ! 1
Using the Bellman verification theorem (Fleming and Soner, 1993, p. 172-173) , it follows that the candidate solution is unique. 
If,
it follows that É þ logðEÞ ÿ logðAÞ É þ K þ logðEÞ (36) so that assuming ␤ is a constant, ␣ needs to vary roughly inversely with log(R) at large values of R. These conditions are considerably less restrictive if we assume E to be bounded away from zero and infinity.
